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Introduction
The Quest for Global Security
Protection Without Protectionism and the 
Challenge of Global Governance
Mary Kaldor and Joseph e. stiglitz
In countries around the world, ordinary citizens feel under threat: As this 
book goes to press, citizens in the advanced industrial countries worry 
about their jobs and about their future and that of their children. Will they 
be able to retire in comfort? Will governments be able to deliver on the re-
tirement benefits they promised? Although those in many of the emerging 
markets have never had things so good, they understand the precariousness 
of their fortunes.
For those who see their way beyond the immediacy of the economic 
crisis, there are more insecurities—from violence, whether the home-bred 
domestic variety or that of terrorists from abroad. And further into the 
future lie the risks posed by climate change.
In other parts of the world, this gradation of risk operates the other 
way round. The threats of violence and climate change are experienced as 
immediate dangers. In zones of insecurity, people are killed, raped, robbed, 
expelled from their homes, kidnapped, or taken hostage. And in environ-
mentally vulnerable areas, they are the victims of excessive flooding or of 
famine on an increasing scale. And beyond these immediate dangers, they 
are often extremely poor, living on less than a dollar a day, without access 
to clean water and sanitation, healthcare, jobs, or even homes.
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To be sure, individuals have always faced risks. Farmers were exposed 
to the variability of weather. Those in coastal areas worried about maraud-
ing pirates. There were always earthquakes, hurricanes, and droughts. But 
today’s risks are unpredictable, with what statisticians call “fat tails,” small 
probabilities of very, very bad outcomes. In the global financial crisis, ex-
ports of some countries fell by more than 30 percent. In some countries, 
youth unemployment has reached 50 percent.
Moreover, many of these risks are global in nature. And this means 
that they may be beyond the ability of individual countries’ coping capac-
ity. In traditional farming communities, the community provided a support 
system for those who were temporarily facing hardship. As the nation-state 
formed, responsibility for social protection shifted to the state and for good 
reason. Some of the most important risks affected virtually everyone in the 
community; the risks were highly correlated. The nation-state had fiscal 
resources that were greater than that of the individual or the market.
In some ways, today the small nation-state is like the small rural com-
munity: Many of the risks are national in character—such as a national 
economic downturn. Small countries feel at the mercy of events beyond 
their control, and they face limited resources. There is little that Greece or 
Ireland can do to restore their own economy. If the European and global 
economies prosper, their economy will prosper; and if these economies do 
not, neither will theirs.
There is, however, a difference: Most of the risks facing farming com-
munities were from acts of nature—a flood or drought. Many of the risks 
facing countries today are man-made. Policies at the national and global 
level affect both the risks that individuals and countries face and their ca-
pacity to respond.
Globalization has increased the scale and velocity of risk. A problem 
anywhere in the system can move quickly across borders. We saw how the 
subprime mortgage crisis in the United States quickly became a global 
crisis. Avian flu and SARS showed how diseases too could move quickly 
around the world. Terrorism—al-Qaeda—has become global. Trying to de-
prive it of a homeland in one country does little good; it quickly shifts its 
base of operations elsewhere.
Even though globalization has increased risks in these ways, it has 
simultaneously decreased the ability of the nation-state—the political 
unit that in the preceding decades had increasingly taken on the role of 
protection—to perform these roles. Of course, the extent to which this 
is true varies. Large nations such as the United States or China retain an 
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independent capacity to act. Middle-ranking nations have often ceded sov-
ereignty to larger entities such as the European Union (EU), while some 
smaller states have become so weak that they are termed fragile or failing 
states. Globalization has undermined the state’s abilities in several ways. 
First it has, whether intentionally or not, reduced the power of taxation, 
particularly of capital. As capital became more mobile, it could move more 
easily from any jurisdiction in which it was (in its view) excessively taxed 
or regulated to another jurisdiction where it was more favorably treated. 
Labor, for the most part, did not have that option of easy mobility. But at 
least part of social protection is protecting the poor and the most vulnera-
ble, and these implicit restrictions on revenue-raising from those most able 
to contribute left many states bereft of the funds required for an adequate 
social protection system.
Not only was the state potentially eviscerated through these limita-
tions in taxation, international rules and standards were established that 
restricted the freedom of the state to act in ways that might protect its citi-
zens. Implicitly, more and more of the legislative power was delegated: Rules 
for trade and finance were set, at least partially, in the international arena. 
Trade agreements, for instance, forced governments to substitute tariffs for 
quotas; and although there are some advantages of tariffication, the change 
also exposed countries to more risk (Dasgupta and Stiglitz 1977). Until 
recently, trade agreements and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
pushed countries toward capital and financial market liberalization—the 
abolition of regulations that helped stabilize cross-border capital flows, re-
sulting in increasing macroeconomic volatility (Stiglitz et al. 2006).
Globalization has also eroded the monopoly of violence—often re-
garded as the defining characteristic of what makes a state. Only a few large 
nations such as the United States, Russia, China, or India still retain the 
capacity to use their military forces unilaterally, although even they are 
theoretically bound by the UN charter that prohibits the use of force ex-
cept in self-defense or if authorized by the UN Security Council.1 For most 
states, their forces are integrated into collective security arrangements such 
as NATO or the EU, and their budgets are insufficient to finance all but 
limited provision of security services. In many states, the capacity to en-
force law and order and to protect people even from everyday crime is also 
greatly weakened and reduced to their only having the capacity to protect 
the ruling elites.
Of course, governments voluntarily ceded sovereignty but especially 
smaller countries felt they had little choice. If they didn’t go along with the 
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international agreements, they risked becoming pariahs, or at the very least 
not partaking of the benefits that would come from global economic inte-
gration. They might console themselves that these were agreements made 
among democratic governments, so that even if their own democratic insti-
tutions had had little role in crafting them, at least other democratic voices 
had been heard. But that was only partially true: Economic agreements 
were typically negotiated by ministries (such as that of trade and industry) 
and usually more closely linked to special interests. In the United States, 
trade agreements were approved on a fast-track basis, which meant that 
Congress could only vote yes or no, without any say in the provisions that 
went into them. Only when civil society groups mounted a concerted cam-
paign, for instance, to give poor countries some access to life-saving drugs 
was the power of the pharmaceutical companies to dictate the terms of the 
intellectual property provisions effectively challenged.
In one way or another, the world has long been globalized—to which 
colonialism and two world wars bear testimony. But globalization only 
became a subject of controversy—it only became “visible”—after the end 
of the Cold War. The bipolar order had dominated the way we perceived 
the world. Growing interconnectedness and the prevalence of new and old 
risks were obscured by our preoccupation with the East–West conflict. The 
binary thinking to which we were habituated allowed the collapse of com-
munism to be interpreted as a victory for the United States. This interpreta-
tion was also a victory for a particular set of ideas that assumed increasing 
ascendancy in the years after the Cold War, a period that saw the United 
States become the sole superpower. American-style capitalism, based on 
notions that free and unfettered markets were the best form of economic 
organization, reigned supreme.2 Unbridled U.S. military power would as-
sure a Pax Americana. America’s military machine, triumphant from its 
victory in the Cold War, faced a slight downscaling under President Clin-
ton, but still, the United States was spending close to 50 percent of what the 
entire world was spending on defense.3 Without any apparent enemies, the 
amounts seemed disproportionate.
the rising risk of protectionism
That easy world has now been irrevocably disturbed. The events of 9/11 
brought home the point that all of that spending didn’t suffice to protect 
the United States from a terrorist attack inside its own borders. Iraq showed 
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that all of that spending—and much more—could not assure an easy vic-
tory against a fragmented and disorderly set of enemies. Western troops 
will withdraw from Afghanistan in 2014, but it is unlikely that Afghanistan 
will be any safer. Indeed, it is fair to say that the United States is yet an-
other country in a long line (which included Russia and the UK) to have to 
admit defeat in that mountainous terrain. Increasingly the War on Terror 
has transmuted to a long-distance campaign of drone strikes, which may be 
successful in killing the leaders of al-Qaeda but contributes to a pervasive 
and disorderly sense of insecurity in those regions where the campaigns are 
conducted. And this war, rather than containing the insecurity presented 
by al-Qaeda and terrorists, has—at least to some extent—spread it. It has 
now spilled over to Pakistan, Yemen, and parts of Africa.
And America’s economic machine, on which all of its military and 
other strengths rested, was showed to be more fragile than even its harsh-
est critics had suggested. The economic crisis exposed a dysfunctional fi-
nancial system that enriched itself at the expense of others by predatory 
lending and by dishonest and anti-competitive practices—not by feats of 
economic wizardry that had led to an economy that was truly more pro-
ductive, as it had claimed. It showed a country where most citizens had 
seen their income decline for more than a decade; a country that, to main-
tain internal law and order, had to imprison a larger fraction of its citizens 
than any other; a country that, as it projected military strength abroad, was 
marked by high levels of violence at home.
There is no longer confidence in the ability of free and unfettered mar-
kets to assure economic security. And there is no longer confidence in the 
ability of the United States to assure the world of its military security, let 
alone the security of the rest of the world.
In the absence of this security, inward retreat is a concern. In the 
economic sphere, what such a retreat would mean is clear: It would al-
most surely entail a high level of protectionism. In the security sphere, 
this would result in another kind of protectionism—where groups of in-
dividuals turn not to the state as the source of their physical security but 
to their own devices—that of the private security company in the gated 
community, the ethnic militias in sectarian conflicts, or the drug cartels 
or the mafia in many global cities. But the danger is that even when these 
new privatized groups were originally intended to provide protection 
against outside threats, they can easily turn against and/or exploit the 
very people they were supposed to protect. This is what is increasingly 
happening.
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Globalization has brought with it problems, but it has also brought 
with it benefits. It has contributed to the spread of democracy and human 
rights. And, when well-managed, globalization has even contributed to 
economic prosperity. It has contributed to moving hundreds of millions of 
people out of poverty in the developing world. The worry is that mindless 
protectionism will be costly to those very people who have gained from 
globalization—to those in the developing world who have benefited from 
the unprecedented global growth of the past half century, as well as to those 
in the developed world, who enjoy the bounty of inexpensive goods even as 
jobs become threatened. Protectionism means the risk of losing all of this.
social protection Without protectionism
There is an alternative path, a reordering of the global economy and society, 
which entails social protection without protectionism. By social protection, 
we mean far more than just an economic safety net for those at the very 
bottom. That’s not good enough for those in the middle who see their life-
style in jeopardy. They want some security against any significant loss in 
living standards.
The issue of protection of society, as we conceive it, goes far beyond 
economics. Citizens are worried about the environment and their physical 
security. In the United States, they worry too about access to healthcare. 
Everywhere, there are worries among all but the very rich about whether 
citizens will be able to have a comfortable retirement, and whether their 
children will be able to live as well as their parents.
In many countries, citizens are being told that, although the market 
may not provide the hoped for security, neither can government. We sim-
ply can’t afford it. The competition resulting from globalization, it is said, 
forces us to be meaner and leaner, and that means we have to scale back 
social protection. But there is a curious irony in such claims: Globaliza-
tion is defended as enriching living standards; yet, it is said, globalization 
prevents society from providing one of the essential things individuals care 
about—security.
We believe that such a conclusion is wrong. Globalization is supposed 
to have increased GDP, and if so, it should have increased the resources we 
have available. We have choices about what to do with those resources: We 
can (as the United States has been doing) devote large amounts to the mili-
tary and incarceration. We could, alternatively, devote more the resources 
stig15686_Book.indb   6 11/29/12   4:16 PM
t h e  Q u e s t  f o r  g l o b a l  s e c u r i t y   7
to social protection. If we fail to pursue policies that result in most citizens 
being better off as a result of globalization, there is likely to be a retreat, 
toward protectionism.
We subtitle this book “Protection Without Protectionism and the Chal-
lenge of Global Governance” because the retreat in economics to protec-
tionism is a metaphor for what could happen in these other arenas—in the 
fiction that by retreating into their own shells, countries can insulate them-
selves from these risks coming from outside their boundaries. Likewise, the 
protectionism of local strongmen and private guards can never be more 
than temporary and will only exacerbate a growing market in violence. The 
gated communities with their high walls are symbolic of such attempts—
and reflect the fact that even though the forces giving rise to insecurity may 
be global, the impacts and responses are often local.
the need for global responses
Local and national responses will never be fully adequate in dealing 
with these global problems. This is most evident in the arena of global 
warming—maintaining the global environment is called a global public 
good. Everyone, regardless of where they live, is affected by the increase in 
carbon concentration in the atmosphere, or the emergence of ozone holes. 
If the global consensus in the scientific community proves correct, Ameri-
ca’s carbon emissions will have devastating effects on faraway places, from 
island states that within a century will no longer exist, to a third of Bangla-
desh that will be submerged. Economists focus on incentives—and under 
current arrangements, those in the United States do not bear the costs of 
the “externalities” that their actions have on others, and so they have little 
incentive to reduce their emissions. There would be large global societal 
benefits from having individuals and firms in the United States (and other 
polluting countries) bear the full costs of their actions. Such disparities be-
tween social and private benefits and costs provide part of the traditional 
rationale for collective action.
Sometimes, the effects of the externalities (or the benefits of public 
goods) are felt only locally. (In the case of public goods, these are referred 
to as local public goods.) In that case, the natural locus of collective action 
is local. Sometimes, the effects are felt nationally, and the natural locus of 
collective action is national. But increasingly, externalities and public goods 
have a global reach, and so collective action should occur at the global level. 
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Otherwise, there is the risk of a “free rider.” If all countries but the United 
States were to restrict their emissions enough, the world might avoid at 
least the worst risks of global warming, yet the United States would be able 
to continue to enjoy its energy- and its emissions-profligate lifestyle. Others 
will, of course, view this as unfair, and their citizens might refuse to support 
emissions reductions. Without a global agreement—a global social con-
tract, a new covenant—at best there will be too many emissions; at worst, 
there will be no agreement at all for emissions reductions.
the inadequacies of current arrangements
The approach pushed by the United States—where each country announces 
its own targets for emission reductions, and there is a global agreement on 
transparency to see that countries live up to their own targets—is likely to 
prove inadequate. It does not address the free rider problem at all. Worse 
still, it encourages countries to be modest in their targets—if the locus of 
criticism is on failing to live up to one’s targets, then the easiest way to avoid 
criticism is to set low targets. This is especially true in a context where 
there are not even agreed-upon norms. To the developing world (and even 
among many in the developed world), the only “fair” set of targets would 
be those where each country has (per capita) the same rights to atmo-
spheric carbon space. For example, if the aggregate amount of emissions 
that the world could absorb from, say, 1992—when the problem of global 
warming was formally recognized by the international community—
onward in order for global warming of more than two degrees centigrade 
to be avoided with a probability of 75 percent is so much, then each coun-
try should have a share of that space in proportion to what its population 
was in 1992. This means that because the United States has used up much 
of its carbon space in the two decades of unrestrained emissions, it should 
reduce its annual emissions by far more than 90 percent in the future. If 
it reduces its emissions slowly, then it will have to reduce its emissions in 
the future even more. But to many Americans, the relevant norm is emis-
sions per dollar of GDP—and in these terms, the United States is “better” 
than China. With such disparities in how each country conceives of what 
its “fair” contribution to reducing emissions should be, and with such 
perverse incentives in announcing targets, an approach where it is left to 
each country to announce its own commitments for emission reductions 
is unlikely to work.
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The problems confronting the international community in dealing 
with global warming are illustrative of those that appear in so many other 
areas. Globalization allowed products produced by one country’s financial 
markets to be sold freely elsewhere. America polluted the world with its 
toxic mortgages. Inside the United States, there is a principle in environ-
mental economics that says that polluters should pay for the damage that 
they create. It is called the polluter pays principle. It is a matter not just of 
equity but also of efficiency: If polluters do not bear the consequences of 
their actions, they have incentives to pollute too much. This principle is 
the basis of U.S. laws on the clean-up of toxic waste dumps. But America 
bore none of the costs of cleaning up the consequences of the toxic assets 
that it dumped around the world. Its bankers made profits; those elsewhere 
bore the losses. If global rules allow the United States to continue to sell 
its defective products elsewhere without bearing the consequences—and if 
buyers elsewhere continue to buy these products—then there is no reason 
either for American firms not to sell these products, or for American regu-
lators to curb its firms. To the contrary, there can be a race to the bottom. 
The jurisdiction with the least onerous regulations and taxation may garner 
for itself the most business. Interestingly, in the recent debate on financial 
regulation (and in particular in discussions on a global bank levy, to help 
pay for the costs imposed by banks on the rest of society), the United States 
took the same position that it took in climate change: There should be no 
global rules. Each country (in the position of the American administration) 
should set its own levies. But that cannot be the basis of standard setting in 
a world with global competition and free capital mobility—where the race 
to the bottom results in such adverse effects.
And the same argument can be applied in the security sphere. Amer-
ica’s wars in Iraq and Afghanistan against al-Qaeda have had the opposite 
effect of recruiting more young men to the Islamist cause, and the victims 
have been primarily Afghans and Iraqis but also, of course, Spaniards, In-
donesians, Londoners, and Americans as well. The use of military force in 
areas where everyday social protection (against violence and material de-
privation) is lacking only makes things worse—escalating a range of cross-
border risks such as terrorism or organized crime.
There are, of course, realists that say this normative approach is ir-
relevant; all that really matters is power. Power resides in the nation-state 
and, in the international arena, in the most powerful of the nation-states. 
The United States uses international institutions and preaches the gospel 
of globalization when it is convenient—when that policy advances its own 
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interests. Thus, the global institutions are mainly instruments for the pro-
jection and continuation of existing power relationships. Consider, for in-
stance, the issue of development: The UN may be a democratic talk shop, 
but real power lies in the IMF and the World Bank, still effectively con-
trolled by the advanced industrial countries.
Much of the international discussion over global governance fits within 
such a mold. In the East Asia crisis, the United States resisted Japan’s 
proposal—and offer of $100 billion—for the creation of an Asian monetary 
fund, which arguably could have led to a shorter and shallower downturn 
in the region and enhanced regional stability going forward. It did so, pre-
sumably out of fear that it would diminish U.S. influence, its hegemony, and 
that of the IMF, where it had veto power.4,5
More recently, the G20 endorsed the idea that the heads of the interna-
tional organizations be chosen on the basis of merit, rather than the current 
system, where the head of the World Bank is always an American, and the 
head of the IMF is always a European. But even key heads of foreign gov-
ernments that pushed the idea were concerned about why the United States 
may have gone along: The IMF was more central to U.S. interests than the 
World Bank, and the new agreement may simply have been paving the way 
for the World Bank to be headed by someone from the developing world 
and the IMF to be headed by an American. But in the first two appoint-
ments made after the G20 agreement (at the IMF and the World Bank, 
respectively), the status quo was maintained: A European was chosen to 
head the IMF and an American to head the World Bank—even though, in 
the latter case, excellent candidates from the developing world—with far 
more relevant experience than the American candidate—were nominated. 
The global economy is changing rapidly, but global governance is changing 
far more slowly.
Still institutions, once created, take on a life of their own, whatever 
the motives of those who were instrumental in their creation. The United 
States may have seen the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a way of 
getting other countries to open their markets, but the international rule 
of law—flawed as it may be—has provided a check on U.S. protection-
ism. America’s cotton subsidies have been declared to be WTO-illegal. 
And yet, things didn’t work out the way that most thought: Rather than 
eliminating its subsidies, the United States bribed Brazil to accept its 
subsidies. Brazil was compensated, but the far poorer people in Africa 
remain victims of the lower cotton prices brought on by America’s cot-
ton subsidies.
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So too, the euro has taken on a life of its own. The European Union 
and the eurozone can be viewed as an experiment in economic integra-
tion. Things have not gone as predicted. This has been especially clear 
as the eurozone crisis has unfolded, with Spain and Greece in deep de-
pression and no end in sight. The construction of the euro was fatally 
flawed—a monetary union was established without a fiscal, banking, or 
a political union. Now there are fears that the euro will collapse leaving a 
trail of beggar-thy-neighbor policies that will reduce economic prosper-
ity and contribute to pervasive insecurity not just in Europe but world-
wide. The euro will only be saved if European states are ready to cede 
much more power to collective institutions, a sort of model of global 
governance.
global governance Without global government
Today we have a system of global governance without global government—
an array of institutions and agreements (global, regional, bilateral) affect-
ing every aspect of life. It is an imperfect system, one which, as we have 
seen, imperfectly addresses many of the key areas where there is a need 
for global collective action. Yet in many areas it has been moving in the 
right direction. Global norms have been or are being established, such as 
those concerning human rights and civil liberties. In the Great Recession 
of 2008, even though many countries (including the United States) resorted 
to protectionism, they did so to a far less extent than they did in the Great 
Depression, partly because of restraints imposed by the WTO and global 
pressure brought to bear by the G20.
The silo nature, through which global governance functions—with 
trade ministers, for instance, negotiating with trade ministers—inhibits the 
ability to take systemic perspectives and provides excessive scope for spe-
cial interests to exercise their influence. One result is that we sometimes 
impose standards where we shouldn’t, and we don’t have them where we 
should; and often the standards that are imposed are more reflective of 
corporate interests than of general interests.
Another major limitation on global governance is the inadequacy of 
enforcement mechanisms. Yet even here, there has been some progress. 
The Montreal convention restricting ozone-destroying gases was effective, 
partly because of the threat of trade sanctions against any country violating 
the agreement.
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Countries have been granted the right to impose tariffs in the interests 
of global environmental public goods (in the shrimp-turtle appellate deci-
sion).6 European courts have barred extradition to the United States when 
U.S. punishments are out of line with international norms.
Part of the reason for progress in global governance is the growing 
recognition that many of the problems are beyond the ability of any single 
state—even the most powerful and the richest—to solve, especially when it 
is constrained by new norms, such as on the uses and abuses of that power. 
Financial constraints too have played a role. If the United States believes 
that it is providing a global public good in its fight against terrorism, it is 
no surprise that it should expect others to make a contribution to the costs 
of this war. The United States has turned to its allies to help in the war in 
Afghanistan. But it has failed to understand that global cooperation, in a 
world without global government, is built on trust and on shared under-
standing. If the United States refuses to respond to concerns, say, of Euro-
pean countries on issues that they view as vital—such as climate change—it 
will inevitably be more difficult for the United States to elicit support in 
areas that it views of vital concern to itself, such as in Afghanistan. And 
if it seeks financial support, the United States must also realize that it will 
not get that support without ceding some control over decision-making. 
For instance, many other countries are skeptical that terrorism can be ad-
dressed through military force; they fear that the War on Terror is creating 
terrorists. A move toward global governance must entail a public global 
discussion about the best ways to deal with the risks and dangers of our 
contemporary world.
Thus, there are deep contradictions in our current system of global 
governance that reflect and sometimes conceal the large imbalances in 
economic, political, and military power and inconsistencies in underlying 
ideologies. We speak of democracy, and yet few in the advanced industrial 
countries would support a global system based on one man, one vote. The 
advanced countries are even reluctant to cede power to those from the 
emerging markets, even as they seek their financial assistance and even as 
they recognize the enormous changes in the global balance of economic 
power that have occurred in recent years. We speak of open markets, 
and yet we worry about being flooded by products from low-wage coun-
tries. We may cover up our distrust of open markets by talking about fair 
trade, but surely we must understand that changing global comparative 
advantages will put the wages of highly paid workers in the advanced in-
dustrial countries in jeopardy. We speak of human equality, yet the lives 
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of Afghans and Iraqis or Somalis matter less than the lives of Americans 
or citizens of NATO countries.
exceptional times
These are exceptional times. The world is facing a series of cataclysmic 
events—the financial crisis of 2008, the current euro crisis, the Fuku-
shima nuclear accident, the revolutions in the Middle East. Exceptional 
times are times that allow us to see new patterns and that open up new 
ways of understanding the world. They are moments when marginalized 
groups are able to introduce their ideas into public opinion. A sizeable 
body of citizenry in the United States and other countries has become 
cosmopolitan—seeing the world through a lens of global social justice. The 
activists involved in the Arab awakening and the Occupy movement in 
Europe and the Americas are widening this lens to a broader population. 
They are challenging the prevailing orthodoxies and developing a critique 
of the way in which national political elites are more responsive to global 
corporate and banking interests than to their own electorates. Even if these 
movements have not (for a variety of reasons) brought about the politi-
cal changes that many hoped, it is clear that the current wave of popular 
mobilization is striking a chord with the mainstream. This is a new global 
generation that takes interconnectedness and communication across the 
world for granted. They represent a possible starting point for a new global 
debate.
Ideas matter, and ideas about what a fair and just world—and a fair 
and democratic system of global governance—might look like are shap-
ing debates about globalization and about how it could be managed better. 
Even in comparison with the moment when we organized our conference, 
we believe that the arguments and proposals in this book are becoming 
increasingly relevant for any systematic analysis of current global risks and 
problems. We hope that the ideas presented here will help in articulating 
the questions that we should be asking and providing at least the begin-
nings of answers.
This book is part of a rapidly developing new field of globalization and 
global governance that focuses on the global community and global col-
lective action. It is distinct from international relations, which focuses on 
relations among nation-states. Nation-states are key actors in globalization, 
but they are not the sole actors. There is no global government, but there 
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is, as we have noted, a complex system of global governance. At the center, 
of course, are international institutions, such as the IMF, WTO, the World 
Bank, and a host of international conventions and treaties helping to create 
a global legal framework. International NGOs and social movements help 
shape global policy. And increasingly, the reach of global law extends down 
below the level of the nation-state to that of the individual and is reflected 
in the establishment of the International Criminal Court or the UN agree-
ment on the “responsibility to protect.”
This book looks at what has traditionally been one of the central respon-
sibilities of the nation-state—providing security to its citizens, protecting 
them against risks posed, for instance, by the threat of violence, economic 
disorder, or environmental hazards. As we have noted, today many of the 
risks come from beyond the nation-state and have to be addressed glob-
ally. This book is unusual in bringing together discussions of three arenas 
that are typically covered by scholars from distinct fields. Security experts, 
environmentalists, political scientists, sociologists, and economists seldom 
break bread together, let alone engage in analytic discussions or in policy 
debates. We brought these disparate scholars together partly because we 
believe that there are strong parallels between what is going on in each 
of these areas—a study in one arena may provide insights into the others. 
But there is an even more profound reason why these topics need to be 
addressed together: They are inextricably intertwined. The failure to pro-
vide a modicum of economic security is giving rise to extremism, which 
may manifest itself in violence and physical insecurity. Violence, in turn, 
impedes growth and leads to economic insecurity. Today, in many parts of 
the world, climate change is bringing droughts, floods, and unparalleled 
levels of economic insecurity. And if the consequences of this economic 
insecurity in places such as Pakistan are not addressed better than they 
have been, there is more than a little risk that already high levels of violence 
will worsen.
The problems are intertwined but so too may be the solutions. Insur-
gencies may be arrested through providing greater economic protection. 
The attempt to reduce carbon emissions can create new jobs that will be an 
engine of growth for the global economy for years ahead.
We stand at a halfway point: The nation-state still remains at the 
center, but it is not up to the task of adequately protecting citizens from 
the threats—economic, physical, environmental, and health—that arise 
from outside its borders. The international community is not yet at the 
stage of providing protection or even of mitigating adequately the risks. 
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In some cases, the international institutions that have been created are 
so flawed that they may even be exacerbating the risks. Yet, there is a be-
ginning. There are nascent institutions; there is a promise that they will 
rise to the task ahead, or at least do better than they have in the past. The 
chapters in this volume are descriptive and prescriptive: They describe 
where we are in global governance today and point to what needs to be 
done in the future.
The chapters in this volume provide a convincing case that the world 
can provide “protection without protectionism” in each of the arenas that 
we examine: That economic, physical, and environmental security can 
be enhanced best by global cooperation, far better than can be achieved 
by withdrawing behind closed doors. That this is the better way is clear. 
Whether it is the path the world will take is less so.
This volume is divided into five sections. The first three sections dis-
cuss key areas in which insecurity has manifested itself: economic insecu-
rity, physical insecurity, and climate insecurity. But although the threats 
that arise in each of these areas can only be addressed through the lens of 
globalization, they play out at every level. Indeed, it is often at the most 
local level, within cities, that we see their full effects. The fourth section 
examines some of the challenges posed to local communities. Finally, part 
5 discusses the implications for our evolving system of global governance.
notes
1. Although the enforcement capability of the UN may be limited, increasingly 
citizens within countries feel reluctant to engage in war without the sanction of the UN.
2. At the same time, America’s dominance of the international scene meant that it 
no longer had to compete for the hearts and minds of those in the Third World. It could 
now impose its interests (or more accurately, its corporate and financial interests) on 
those elsewhere, cloaking them with a free- market rhetoric.
3. In 2000, U.S. military expenditure was 41 percent of world military expenditure 
in current U.S. dollar reference (World Development Indicators, World Bank, 2010).
4. Even if the United States had not opposed this initiative, it might not have been 
brought to fruition, but U.S. opposition ensured its failure.
5. So too, the United States opposed the UK’s proposal for the creation of a strong 
Financial Stability Board (FSB) that would help create stronger financial regulatory 
standards—of the kind that might have avoided the crisis ten years later—because that 
would cede power to a body that might be pushing in a direction that was the opposite 
of the dangerous deregulatory agenda that the U.S .Treasury was pursuing. (Instead, 
a much weaker FSB was created, which helped codify the deregulatory standards. To 
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be fair, even if a stronger regulatory body had been created, it is unlikely that stronger 
standards would have been adopted, with the opposition of the Bush administration 
wedded to a deregulatory philosophy.)
6. See, for instance, the discussion in chapter 6 of J. E. Stiglitz, Making Globaliza-
tion Work (2006).
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